{"id":4473,"date":"2023-05-05T09:45:24","date_gmt":"2023-05-05T09:45:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/?p=4473"},"modified":"2023-06-01T15:23:24","modified_gmt":"2023-06-01T15:23:24","slug":"dire-state-social-care-undermined-pandemic-response","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/dire-state-social-care-undermined-pandemic-response\/","title":{"rendered":"Dire state of social care sector undermined pandemic response, study finds"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Lack of visibility of the sector, unclear accountability, insecure funding and poor workforce pay and conditions impacted the sector\u2019s ability to implement protective measures in a timely way, according to a <a href=\"http:\/\/tracking.nuffieldtrust.org.uk\/tracking\/click?d=7V2RMK2rhlw547an90ljTZNukYvwJ47R30YSjdIzQnWnobfTetmK4_iVtXGYF82flzyN8tjYxKMUmlIu6YrVfS3VJF1H-AXSFd7lodWHOFN2H_20kX0XYjTbv9reApN03C7RP4HHd8FzdzxGlnekjyFJpN8BtJmVK8rtTrPDRKPDb4QGRdHMp3A1zS3znCpool-w8VdLQDPa0H8oScWMrck1\">new report<\/a> published by the Nuffield Trust.<\/p>\n<p>The report is the result of a two-year joint study between the Nuffield Trust and the London School of Economics, and looks at issues which emerged with the Covid-19 response in the social care sector in England. Focusing on the initial four months of the pandemic response (February-May 2020), it found that the fragmented nature of the system and a shortage of civil servants working on social care contributed to confusion over who was responsible for decisions and implementation in the Covid response, which, for example, undermined the effective distribution of PPE and testing for care staff.<\/p>\n<p>The study also concluded that successive governments failed to respond to concerns surrounding pandemic-preparedness identified by multiple cross-government planning exercises. Amid a poor understanding of the sector and its capabilities within government, many smaller care providers were unable to effectively accommodate infection control measures and adhere to the slew of ever-changing guidance and regulation, with disastrous consequences for the nearly 20,000 care home residents who died in England and Wales in spring 2020.<\/p>\n<p>Natasha Curry, Deputy Director of Policy at the Nuffield Trust, commented: \u201cWhat happened to social care at the start of the pandemic represents the consequences of letting one of our most important public services languish in constant crisis for years. Those early months exposed an array of weaknesses within social care that impacted the shape, speed and effectiveness of the response. Many of these difficult challenges could have been eased had warnings been heeded. Governments of all hues have failed to make social care and those who need it a priority.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Drawing on interviews with sector experts, workshops with social care stakeholders (including people who use care), policy documents, and literature, the report identified areas that could put social care on a more resilient footing in the future.<\/p>\n<p>The report found:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The government, NHS England and Public Health England missed opportunities to prepare the sector for a pandemic, or other crises, in the years immediately before Covid-19. They excluded social care from pandemic-planning exercises such as Exercise Alice. After exercises that did include the sector, such as Operation Cygnus, action was not taken to address the problems that were identified. Once infections took hold in England, the government did not sufficiently apply pre-existing knowledge of infection spread in care settings.<\/li>\n<li>There had been no dedicated director general for social care in the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) since 2016. No adult social care representatives sat on the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) in the opening weeks of the pandemic. This meant social care leaders felt largely invisible, despite the critical role of the sector.<\/li>\n<li>The wider Covid-19 response, which was perceived to be hospital-focused at the outset, caused many issues for social care staff because the structure of the workforce and what their jobs involved were not well understood. For example, a lack of access to Covid testing and sick pay had far-reaching consequences for staff when self-isolation policies were in place, especially for those on zero hours contracts.<\/li>\n<li>The long-term tendency of governments to allocate funding to social care in the form of sporadic injections of cash limited the scope for strategic investment and had implications for how robust the sector, and its infrastructure, were when entering the pandemic. Many providers of care, which are often small businesses, entered the pandemic with little or no cash reserves.<\/li>\n<li>During the pandemic, the succession of emergency funding pots offered to social care initially took a long time to reach the front line, and their short-term nature prevented strategic planning. While seen as a lifeline for care providers, extensions to the funding were frequently announced with only weeks, days or in one case hours before the end of the scheme and did not allow those on the front line to spend it to meet the needs they could see.<\/li>\n<li>There was a lack of data and information about who uses and provides adult social care services and how to communicate with them. Covid-19 has accelerated efforts to collect data, and this is helping to lay the foundations of a robust source of standard data.<\/li>\n<li>The government did not adequately consider the fragile state and the complexity of the adult social care infrastructure, in particular residential care buildings and equipment. Small organisations, that make up much of the sector, lacked the back office capacity to interpret continually updated guidance and outdated care home buildings struggled to isolate or group together infected residents and to accommodate wider infection control measures.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>There has been some positive progress in learning from these problems, with the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) bolstering its social care capacity and expertise and the signaling of it as a priority area with the appointment not only of a specific director general but also a chief social care nurse.<\/p>\n<p>Following the first four months of the Covid-19 response, progress was made to plan for ongoing outbreaks in the short to medium term, for instance with the establishment of the social care taskforce in June 2020 and the decision to continue to provide PPE purchased centrally. The smoother subsequent rollout of vaccinations in social care settings pointed to improved collaboration between the government and social care partners, and the prioritisation of carers in the vaccination rollout was widely regarded as a positive step forward.<\/p>\n<p>Adelina Comas-Herrera, report co-author from the Care Policy and Evaluation Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science, said: \u201cThe pandemic has had a tragic impact on people who use social care and those who provide care, unpaid and paid. This has been a shared experience internationally but the evidence suggests that some countries were able to cope better than others. Our research shows that social care in England needs a system-wide reform to be able to respond not just to emergencies, but to the implications of longevity and competition for workforce with other sectors.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Care Minister, Helen Whately, said: \u201cDuring the pandemic [the government] supported social care with \u00a32.9bn in specific Covid funding, sent out more than 230m Covid tests to care homes and prioritised social care for Covid vaccinations. We are committed to learning lessons from the pandemic and are investing up to \u00a37.5bn over the next two years to put social care on a stronger financial footing, help reduce waiting lists and alleviate workforce pressures.\u201d<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>The full report can be accessed <a href=\"http:\/\/tracking.nuffieldtrust.org.uk\/tracking\/click?d=7V2RMK2rhlw547an90ljTZNukYvwJ47R30YSjdIzQnWnobfTetmK4_iVtXGYF82flzyN8tjYxKMUmlIu6YrVfS3VJF1H-AXSFd7lodWHOFNLvPyNkyF8x1yxBoyJr1KnMkwpD4OL_KluvNnROrtVNdQILAfRYVHkz_Kt8lvCtQ5Ec5bZq1EBLSu3jQswdrbsZuqFDlFDFDHGVXvYh-aGL501\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Structural weaknesses, unaddressed by successive governments, left social care struggling to provide the service and protection that people needed during the initial waves of Covid-19.  <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":4474,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[25,28],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4473"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4473"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4473\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4524,"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4473\/revisions\/4524"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4474"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4473"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4473"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/integratedcarejournal.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4473"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}